Abstract-This paper considers point-to-point secure communication over flat fading channels under an outage constraint. More specifically, we extend the definition of outage capacity to account for the secrecy constraint and obtain sharp characterizations of the corresponding fundamental limits under two different assumptions on the transmitter channel state information (CSI). First, we find the outage secrecy capacity assuming that the transmitter has perfect knowledge of the legitimate and eavesdropper channel gains. In this scenario, the capacity achieving scheme relies on opportunistically exchanging private keys between the legitimate nodes. These keys are stored in a key buffer and later used to secure delay sensitive data using the Vernam's one time pad technique. We then extend our results to the more practical scenario where the transmitter is assumed to know only the legitimate channel gain. Here, our achievability arguments rely on privacy amplification techniques to generate secret key bits. In the two cases, we also characterize the optimal power control policies which, interestingly, turn out to be a judicious combination of channel inversion and the optimal ergodic strategy. Finally, we analyze the effect of key buffer overflow on the overall outage probability.
Most of the recent work on information theoretic secrecy is, arguably, inspired by Wyner's wiretap channel [1] . In this setup, a passive eavesdropper listens to the communication between two legitimate nodes over a separate communication channel. While attempting to decipher the message, no limit is imposed on the computational resources available to the eavesdropper. This assumption led to defining perfect secrecy capacity as the maximum achievable rate subject to zero mutual information rate between the transmitted message and the signal received by the eavesdropper. In the additive Gaussian noise scenario [2] , the perfect secrecy capacity turned out to be the difference between the capacities of the legitimate and eavesdropper channels. Therefore, if the eavesdropper channel has a higher channel gain, information theoretic secure communication is not possible over the main channel. Recent works have shown how to exploit multipath fading to avoid this limitation [3] [4] [5] . The basic idea is to opportunistically exploit the instants when the main channel enjoys a higher gain than the eavesdropper channel to exchange secure messages. This opportunistic secrecy approach was shown to achieve nonzero ergodic secrecy capacity even when on average the eavesdropper channel has favorable conditions over the legitimate channel. Remarkably, this result still holds even when the CSI of the eavesdropper channel is not available at the legitimate nodes [3] .
The ergodic result in [3] applies only to delay tolerant traffic, e.g., file downloads. Early attempts at characterizing the delay limited secrecy capacity drew the negative conclusion that nonzero delay limited secrecy rates are not achievable, over almost all channel distributions, due to secrecy outage events corresponding to the instants when the eavesdropper channel gain is larger than the main one [6] , [7] . Later, it was shown in [8] that, interestingly, a nonzero delay limited secrecy rate could be achieved by introducing private key queues at both the transmitter and the receiver. These queues are used to store private key bits that are shared opportunistically between the legitimate nodes when the main channel is more favorable than the one seen by the eavesdropper. These key bits are used later to secure the delay sensitive data using the Vernam one time pad approach [9] . Hence, secrecy outages are avoided by simply storing the secrecy generated previously, in the form of key bits, and using them whenever the channel conditions are more advantageous for the eavesdropper. However, in [8] , the authors do not provide sharp capacity results or derive the corresponding optimal power control policies, which is the main objective of this paper. In particular, 1) We consider delay limited communication in a block fading channel where the messages to be transmitted in a block has to be communicated securely within that particular block. We find compact expressions of the secrecy outage capacity for the scenario where 1) perfect knowledge about the main and eavesdropper channels 0018-9448 © 2013 IEEE are available a priori at the transmitter, referred to as full channel state information (CSI), and 2) only the perfect knowledge main channel states are available at the transmitter, referred to as main CSI. We provide a graphical approach to evaluate the capacity. 2) We develop a (secrecy outage) capacity-achieving scheme that utilizes privacy amplification to generate secret key bits from the transmitted signal, and store them in the form of secret key bits in the transmitter and legitimate receiver. These key bits are utilized to secure the delay sensitive data using Vernam's one time pad. This approach is proven to be optimal even when the eavesdropper CSI is not known at the legitimate nodes, since the statistical knowledge of eavesdropper channel enables us to generate key bits over many fading blocks. 3) We evaluate the optimal power allocation in order to achieve the secrecy outage capacity and provide a novel power controller, which combines secure waterfilling and channel inversion policies. 4) Past studies that make use of a key queue assume that the associated buffer has an infinite size. Here, we analyze the impact of a finite buffer and explicitly evaluate the amount of reduction in the achievable secret data rate if a finite key buffer is used. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We formally introduce our system model in Section II. In Section III, we obtain the capacity results for the full and main CSI scenarios. The optimal power control policies, for both cases, are derived in Section IV. The effect of key buffer overflow on the outage probability is investigated in Section V. We provide simulations to support our main results in Section VI. Finally, Section VII offers some concluding remarks. To enhance the flow of the paper, the proofs are collected in the Appendices.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We study a point-to-point wireless communication link, in which a transmitter wishes to send information to a legitimate receiver, in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. We divide time into discrete slots, where blocks are formed of channel uses, and blocks combine to form a superblock. Let the communication period consist of superblocks. We use the notation to denote the th block in the th superblock. We adopt a block fading channel model, in which the channel is assumed to be constant over a block, and changes randomly from one block to the next. Within each block , the observed signals at the receiver and at the eavesdropper are respectively, where is the transmitted signal, is the received signal by the legitimate receiver, is the received signal by the eavesdropper, and and are two mutually independent i.i.d. vector processes that are also independent of other random variables. Each sample of and are independently drawn from circularly symmetric, unit variance normal distribution. We assume that the channel gains of the main channel and the eavesdropper channel are i.i.d. complex random variables. The power gains of the fading channels are denoted by and . We sometimes use the vector notation for simplicity, use the notation to denote the set of channel gains observed until block , and use backslash as relative complement operator, e.g., denotes the set of gains of all blocks except . We use identical notation for other parameters as well, and denote the sample realization sequences with lowercase letters. We assume that the probability density function of instantaneous channel gains, denoted as , is well defined, and is known by all parties. Under both full CSI and main CSI cases, the eavesdropper has complete knowledge of both the main and the eavesdropper channels. Let denote the power allocated at block . We consider a long term power constraint (or average power constraint) such that, (1) for some . Let denote the set of messages to be transmitted with a delay constraint.
becomes available to the transmitter at the beginning of block , and needs to be securely communicated and decoded at the legitimate receiver at the end of that particular block. We consider the problem of constructing codes to communicate message packets of equal size, which consists of 1) A stochastic encoder that maps , to based on the available CSI, where summarizes the previously transmitted signals, 1 and 2) A decoding function that maps to at the legitimate receiver. Note that, we consider the current block to be a function of the past blocks as well. This kind of generality allows us to store shared randomness to be exploited in the future to increase the achievable secrecy rate.
Define the error event with parameter at block as (2) which occurs either when the decoder makes an error, or when the power expended is greater than . Let denote the messages to be communicated in all the blocks except . The equivocation rate at the eavesdropper is defined as the entropy rate of the message at block , conditioned on the received signal by the eavesdropper during the transmission period, available eavesdropper CSI, and messages 2 to be communicated in all blocks except the message at block , which is equal to . The secrecy 1 An exception is for , in which case the previous signals are summarized by . 2 Although the messages are mutually independent, they may be dependent conditioned on eavesdroppers' received signal , therefore equivocation expression includes conditioning on .
outage event at rate with parameter at block is defined as (3) where the equivocation outage occurs if the equivocation rate at block is less than ,
and information outage occurs if accumulated mutual information on the message remains below its entropy, :
Defining as the complement of the event , we now characterize the notion of -achievable secrecy capacity.
Definition 1: Rate is achievable securely with at most probability of secrecy outage if, for any fixed , there exists a sequence of codes of rate no less than such that, for all large enough , and , the conditions
are satisfied for all , . We call such an -achievable secrecy rate. Note that the conditioning in (4) is based on the realization of all the channel gains, and the probability expressions are over . Also note that the security constraints are not imposed on the first superblock.
Definition 2: The -achievable secrecy capacity is the supremum of all -achievable secrecy rates.
Remark 1: The notion of secrecy outage was previous defined and used in [6] and [7] . However, those works did not consider the technique of storing shared randomness for future use, and in that case, secrecy outage depends only on the instantaneous channel states, and hence the achievable data rates were rather suboptimal. In our case, secrecy outage depends on previous channel states as well. We illustrate the suboptimality of the previous works in Example 1. Note that we do not impose a secrecy outage constraint on the first superblock ( ). We refer to the first superblock as an initialization phase used to generate initial common randomness between the legitimate nodes. This phase only needs to appear once in the communication lifetime of that link. In other words, when a session (which consists of superblocks) between the associated nodes is over, they would have sufficient number of common key bits for the subsequent session, and would not need to initiate the initialization step again.
III. CAPACITY RESULTS
In this section, we investigate -achievable secrecy capacity under two different cases; full CSI and main CSI at the transmitter. We show in capacity proofs that the outage capacity achieving power allocation functions lie in the space of stationary power allocation functions that are functions of instantaneous transmitter CSI. Hence for full CSI, we constrain ourselves to the set of stationary power allocation policies that are functions of , Similarly for main CSI, we consider the set of power allocation policies that are functions of only. For a given power allocation function , define
where , and the logarithms are with respect to base 2. Note that, is the supremum of achievable main channel rates, without the secrecy constraint. Also, is the nonnegative difference between main channel and eavesdropper channel's supremum achievable rates. Similarly, for main CSI, we consider and for .
A. Full CSI Theorem 1: Let the transmitter have full CSI. Then, for any , , the -achievable secrecy capacity is equal to bits per channel use, where (10) subject to (11) (12) A detailed proof of achievability and converse part is provided in Appendix A. Here, we briefly justify the result. For a given power allocation function , is the supremum of the secret key generation rates within a block that experiences channel gains [2] . This implies that the expected achievable secrecy rate [3] is without the outage constraint. With the outage constraint, the fluctuations of due to fading are unacceptable, since can go below the desired rate when the channel conditions are unfavorable (e.g., when , ). Hence, we utilize secret key buffers to smoothen out these fluctuations to provide secrecy rate of at each block. The generated secrecy is stored in secret key buffers of both the transmitter and receiver, and is utilized to secure message of same size using Vernam's one-time pad technique. Note that every single generated key bit is used exactly once, such that keys generated in th superblock are used in ( )-st superblock. Secrecy outage may still occur when either there is not enough key bits left at the key queue, or the main channel rate for the block remains below the desired rate. In this case, we do not attempt to transmit the message, hence no key bits are expended. Therefore, with probability of secrecy outage, a secrecy rate of could be achieved. The channel outage constraint (11) on the other hand is a necessary condition for the main channel to support the desired rate, avoid information outages (5), and satisfy the secrecy outage constraint in (7). Tables II and III, respectively. According to the pessimistic result in [6] and [8] , no nonzero rate can be achieved with a secrecy outage probability in this case. However, according to Theorem 1, rate can be achieved with secrecy outage probability 3 for any . A sample path is provided for both schemes in Fig. 1 , and it is shown how our scheme avoids secrecy outage in the second block. Note that, for , the rate cannot be achieved due the limitation of instantaneous main channel rate, as shown in Table III . Instead, a secrecy rate of only can be achieved. In Example 2, we show that, through a more clever control of the power expended, we can achieve much higher rates.
B. Main CSI Theorem 2:
Let the transmitter have main CSI. Then, for any , , the -achievable secrecy capacity is equal to bits per channel use, where (13) subject to (14) (15)
Although the problems (10)- (12) and (13)- (15) are of the same form, due to the absence of eavesdropper CSI, the maximization in this case is over power allocation functions that depend on the main channel state only. Hence, . A detailed proof of achievability and converse is provided in Appendix B. As in the full CSI case, our achievable scheme uses similar key buffers and Vernam's one time pad technique to secure the message. The main difference is the generation of secret key bits. Due to the lack of knowledge of at the transmitter, secret key bits cannot be generated within a block. In [8] , a suboptimal slot division approach was utilized, in which part of each slot was used in generating keys, and the other part was used in transmitting the delay sensitive data. Instead, we generate keys over superblocks using privacy amplification, carefully designed based on the sample distribution of . Roughly, over a superblock the receiver can reliably obtain bits of information, while the eavesdropper can obtain bits of information. With privacy amplification, bits of secret key can be extracted. Now, we show that power allocation policy has minimal impact on the performance in the high power regime.
Theorem 3: For any , the -achievable secrecy capacities with full CSI and main CSI converge to the same value (16) Proof: For such that , we can see from (9) that , and for , . Furthermore, for , we can see from (8) that
. Let (no power control), which does not require any CSI. Then, we obtain (17) Combining (16) and (17), we obtain and , since probability density function of is well defined. Hence, channel outage constraints (11) and (14) are not active in the high-power regime. From (10)- (12) and (13)- (15), we conclude that (16) holds.
Our simulation results also illustrate that the power allocation policy has minimal impact on the importance in the high-power regime. On the other hand, when the average power is limited, the optimality of the power allocation function is of critical importance, which is the focus of the following section.
IV. OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION STRATEGY

A. Full CSI
The optimal power control strategy, is the stationary strategy that solves the optimization problem (10)- (12) . In this section, we will show that is a time sharing between the channel inversion power policy, and the secure waterfilling policy. We first introduce the channel inversion power policy , which is the minimum required power to maintain main channel rate of , (18) Note that, main CSI knowledge is sufficient for . Next we introduce ,
We call it the "secure waterfilling" power policy because it maximizes the ergodic secrecy rate without any outage constraint, and resembles the "waterfilling" power control policy. Here, the parameter determines the power expended on average. Now, let us define a time-sharing region (20) which is a function of parameters and . 
Let be the power allocation function that solves this subproblem. Note that for , this problem is identical to (10)- (12), hence giving us , and . We will prove the existence and uniqueness of such .
Lemma 1: There exists a unique such that the subproblem (25)-(27) has a solution for all , which is found by solving (28) for , where the constant is chosen such that . Proof is provided in Appendix C-A. Lemma 2: For any ,
where and are parameters that satisfy (26) and (27) with equality.
Proof is provided in Appendix D. It is left to show there exists a unique that satisfies .
Lemma 3:
is a continuous nonincreasing function of .
Proof is provided in Appendix C-B. Lemma 4: There exists a unique , , which satisfies . Proof is provided in Appendix C-C. This concludes the proof of the theorem.
Due to (21), the optimal power allocation function is a time-sharing between the channel inversion and secure waterfilling; a balance between avoiding channel outages, hence secrecy outages, and maximizing the expected secrecy rate. The time sharing region determines the instants , for which avoiding channel outages are guaranteed through the choice of . Equation (23) ensures that channel outage probability is at most , and (24) ensures that average power constraint is met with equality. Equation (22), on the other hand, is an immediate consequence of (10) .
Note that, an extreme case is , which occurs when for any , i.e., the secure waterfilling solution itself satisfies the channel outage probability in (11) . However, that the other extreme ( ) cannot occur for any nonzero due to (21). The parameter can be found graphically as shown in Fig. 2, by plotting and TABLE IV  TIME SHARING REGIONS,   TABLE V , as a function of . The abscissa of the unique intersection point is . Example 2: Consider the same system model in Example 1. We have found that for use is achievable with probability of secrecy outage with no power control, i.e., for . Let , we will see if we can do better than with power control. Solving the problem (21)-(24), we can see that 4 the time-sharing and power expended in each state are as given in Tables IV and V. For , i.e., the legitimate channel has a better gain, secure waterfilling is used and when , secret key bits cannot be generated, but channel inversion is used to guarantee a main channel rate of , which is secured by the excess keys generated during the state . As a result, we can see that a rate of bits per channel use is achievable, which corresponds to increase with respect to no power control. As mentioned in Theorem 3, this gain diminishes at the high power regime, i.e., when . We also study the case with , for which a secrecy rate of can be achieved, as illustrated in Example 1. Solving Problems (21)- (24) for , we obtain the power allocation in Table VII , for which a secrecy rate of bit per channel use is achievable. As shown in Table VI , channel inversion guarantees a main channel rate of at all times, which was not possible without power control as shown in Example 1. 
B. Main CSI
Here, we find the optimal power control strategy , which solves the optimization problem (13)- (15) . Let us define the main CSI secure waterfilling power policy , such that is the maximum of 0, and the solution of the following equation:
is the unique solution to
where is the expected secrecy rate under the power allocation policy . Note that, optimal power allocation function takes a form similar to Theorem 4, except replaces , and the time-sharing regions are different.
Proof: The proof follows the approach in full CSI case, hence we omit the details for brevity. Define the subproblem where is a constant that satisfies , and is a constant that satisfies (36) with equality. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 2, and is provided in Appendix E.
The graphical solution in Fig. 2 to find also generalizes to the main CSI case.
V. SIZING THE KEY BUFFER
The proofs of the capacity results of Section III assume availability of infinite size secret key buffers at the transmitter and receiver, which mitigate the effect of fluctuations in the achievable secret key bit rate due to fading. Finite-sized buffers, on the other hand will lead to a higher secrecy outage probability due to wasted key bits by the key buffer overflows. Here, we revisit the full CSI problem, and consider key buffer sizes normalized with respect to the number of channel uses in a block, , as follows. We define to be the normalized buffer size, 5 in terms of bits per channel use, required to achieve rate with at most probability of secrecy outage.
Theorem 6: Let , and . Then,
where is the power allocation policy defined in (29), for parameter . Before providing the proof, we first interpret this result. If buffer size is infinite, we can achieve rate with probability of secrecy outage. With finite buffer, we can achieve the same rate with probability of secrecy outage. Considering this difference to be the price that we have to pay due to the finiteness of the buffer, we can see that the normalized buffer size required scales with , as . Proof: Achievability follows from simple modifications to the capacity achieving scheme described in Appendix A. We will first study the key queue dynamics, then using the heavy traffic limits, we provide an upper bound to the key loss ratio due to buffer overflows. Then, we relate key loss ratio to the secrecy outage probability, and conclude the proof.
For the key queue dynamics, we use a single index to denote the time index instead of the double index , where . We consider transmission at outage secrecy rate of , and use power allocation function , which solves the problem (25)-(27). Let us define as the key queue process with buffer size , and let . To simplify notation, let us consider to denote the value of at block , and similarly define as well. Then, during each block , 1) the transmitter and receiver agree on secret key bits at rate bits/channel use using privacy amplification, and store the key on their secret key buffers, 2) the transmitter pulls key bits at rate bits/channel use from its secret key buffer to secure the message stream at rate bits/channel use using one time pad, and transmits over the channel, 5 Note that, actual key buffer would be of size bits.
as explained in Appendix A. The dynamics of the normalized key queue 6 can therefore be modeled by
Note that , due to the definition of . Let be the time average loss ratio over the first blocks, for buffer size , which is defined as the ratio of the amount of loss of key bits due to overflows, and the total amount of input key bits (40) Then, we can see that ,
follows from (39), (40), and the fact that .
Lemma 6:
converges in distribution to an almost surely finite random variable.
The proof is provided in Appendix F-A. This implies that exists. Now, we provide our asymptotic result for the key loss ratio. We define the drift and variance of this process as (42) and respectively, where (42) follows from the definition of . Lemma 7: For any , the key loss ratio satisfies the following asymptotic relationship:
The proof is provided in Appendix F-B. Here, (44) follows from the union bound, and second term follows from (63) and (75) in Appendix A, which shows that there exists some packet size large enough such that . Equation (46) implies that secrecy outage probability (7) We can see that (38) follows from (49), since as , 1) , where converges as shown in (17), hence we can safely drop that term from the numerator, since the denominator diverges. 2) .
3)
, where 
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we conduct simulations to illustrate our main results with two examples. In the first example, we analyze the relationship between -achievable secrecy capacity and average power. We assume that both the main channel and eavesdropper channel are characterized by Rayleigh fading, where the main channel and eavesdropper channel power gains follow exponential distribution with means 2 and 1, respectively. Since Rayleigh channel is noninvertible, maintaining a nonzero secrecy rate with zero secrecy outage probability is impossible. In  Fig. 3 , we plot the -achievable secrecy capacity as a function of the average power, for outage probability, for both full CSI and main CSI cases. It can be clearly observed from the figure that the gap between capacities under full CSI and main CSI vanishes as average power increases, which support the result of Theorem 3.
In the second example, we study the relationship between the buffer size, key loss ratio, and the outage probability. We assume that both the main and eavesdropper channel gains follow a chi-square distribution of degree 2, but with means 2 and 1, respectively. We focus on the full CSI case, and consider the scheme described in Section V. We consider transmission at secrecy rate of with the use of the power allocation policy that solves the problem (25)-(27). For , and the average power constraint , we plot the key loss ratio (40), as a function of buffer size in Fig. 4 , for , , and , where is the -achievable secrecy capacity. It is shown in Lemma 7 of Section V that expect the key loss ratio decreases as increases, which is observed in Fig. 4 . Finally, we study the relationship between the secrecy outage probability and the buffer size for a given rate. In Fig. 5 , we plot the secrecy outage probabilities, denoted as , as a function of buffer size for the same encoder parameters. On the same graph, we also plot our asymptotic result given in Theorem 6, which provides an upper bound on the required buffer size to achieve outage probability for rate , with the assumption that (38) is an equality for any . We can see that, this theoretical result serves as an upper bound on the required buffer size when , which is the additional secrecy outages due to key buffer overflows, is very small. Another important observation from Figs. 4 and 5 is that, for a fixed buffer size, although the key loss ratio decreases as increases, secrecy outage probability increases. This is due to the fact that key bits are pulled from the key queue at a faster rate, hence the decrease in the key loss ratio does not compensate for the increase of the rate that key bits are pulled from the key queue, therefore the required buffer size to achieve same is higher for larger values of .
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper obtained sharp characterizations of the secrecy outage capacity of block flat fading channels under the assumption full and main CSI at the transmitter. In the two cases, our achievability scheme relies on opportunistically exchanging private keys between the legitimate nodes and using them later to secure the delay sensitive information. We further derive the optimal power control policy in each scenario revealing an interesting structure based by judicious time sharing between time sharing and the optimal strategy for the ergodic. Finally, we investigate the effect of key buffer overflow on the secrecy outage probability when the key buffer size is finite.
APPENDIX A
A) Proof of Theorem 1: First, we prove the achievability. Let us fix , and consider a power allocation policy , that satisfies the constraints (14) and (15). We show that for any , there exist some and large enough such that the constraints in Definition 1 are satisfied, which implies that any is an -achievable secrecy rate. The outage capacity is then found by maximizing based on constraints (10)- (14) . For notational simplicity, we will use to denote the value of at block , and similarly define . Our scheme, shown in Fig. 6 , utilizes secret key buffers at both the transmitter and legitimate receiver, where 1) At the end of every block , using privacy amplification, legitimate nodes (transmitter and receiver) generate bits of secret key from the transmitted signal in that particular block, and store it in their secret key buffers. We denote the generated secret key at the transmitter as , and at the receiver as . 2) At every block , , the transmitter pulls bits from its secret key buffer to secure the outage constrained message of size , using Vernam's one time pad. The receiver uses the same key to correctly decode the message. We denote the pulled key at the transmitter as , and at the receiver as . Keys generated at -st superblock are used only in the -th superblock, and every generated key is only used once. When certain conditions are not met, this stage is skipped; the message is not transmitted, and the keys are not pulled from the key queue. We call this particular event "encoder outage," and denote it as , where: 1) Channel outage ( ): Channel is not suitable for reliable transmission at rate , i.e., . Since satisfies (14) , due to the definition in (11) and (12) , for any 7 (50) 7 Here, we interchangeably use , and due to stationarity of , drop index .
2) Key outage ( ): There are not enough key bits in the key queue to secure , i.e.,
3) Artificial outage ( ): The transmitter declares "outage," even though reliable secure transmission of is possible. This is introduced to control the key queue dynamics and bound the probability of key outages, which is covered in the secrecy outage analysis. By definition, the events are mutually independent, they are also independent of other random variables, and satisfy the equality (51) for any . Note that, due to our assumption that keys generated in -st superblock are used in th superblock, all the blocks the first superblock observe key outages, therefore secrecy outages, yet it does not violate the constraints in Definition 1. Also note that, we will show that for any , there exist , and are large enough such that the events and are equivalent. Encoding: Our random coding arguments rely on an ensemble of codebooks generated according to a zero mean Gaussian distribution with variance . 8 
1) When
does not occur, the message is secured with the secret key bits pulled from the key queue, using one time pad 9 (52) Clearly, . , and transmits the codeword indexed by over the channel. The reason for transmitting and is to confuse the eavesdropper to the fullest extent in the privacy amplification process.
Decoding: The receiver finds the jointly typical pair, where 1) when does not occur. 8 Note that, it is also possible to use a finite number of codebooks by partitioning the set of channel gains, and using a different Gaussian codebook for every partition [3] . 9 We assume that both the message and the key are converted to binary form in this process. 2) when occurs. Define the error events Note that, the main channel at slot can be viewed as an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel with channel gain , which has instantaneous capacity of [9] . The encoding rate (rate of ) is equal to , which is below the instantaneous main channel capacity. Therefore, random coding arguments guarantee us that , such that , and . Privacy amplification: At the end of every block , the transmitter and receiver generate secret key bits, by applying a universal hash 10 function on the exchanged signals in that particular block. First, we provide the definition of a universal hash function.
Definition 3 ([11]):
A class of functions is universal, if for any in , the probability that is at most when is chosen at random from according to a uniform distribution.
Lemma 9: For any , , there exists such that, , and for any block , the transmitter and receiver generate secret key bits and , respectively, such that if the error event does not occur, and (53) (54) The proof follows the approach of [12] , which applies privacy amplification to Gaussian channels. We provide it in Appendix A-B. Now, we will show that for this scheme, the error constraint in (6) , and the secrecy outage constraint in (7) is satisfied. To simplify notation, we will frequently use . Note that, for any , the Markov chain in Fig. 7 is satisfied, which could be observed from Fig. 6 . These Markov relations will be repeatedly used in secrecy outage analysis.
Error Analysis: The probability of error event in (6) can be bounded as (55) (56) where (56) where (58) follows from (2) , and the union bound, (59) follows from the fact that when does not occur, , and (60) follows from the union bound. The first term of (60) can be bounded as due to definition of , and the choice of . Similarly, the third term can be bounded as due to definition of , and the choice of . The second term can be bounded as where follows from the fact that keys used in th superblock are generated in -st superblock, and follows due to the definition of . Therefore, the error constraint in (6) is satisfied.
Secrecy Outage Analysis:
The following lemmas will be useful in the secrecy outage analysis.
Lemma 10: For any , there exists some such that for , the events and coincide with probability 1, i.e., (61) Proof of Lemma 10 is provided in Appendix A-B. Secrecy outage probability can be bounded above as (62) (63) where the first equality follows from the definition of secrecy outage in (3), (62) follows from Lemma 10, and (63) follows from the union bound. Now, we upper bound the first term. Note that (64) by definition in (4), and the fact that the universal hash function used is revealed to the eavesdropper, hence the entropy of is conditioned on as well. For , we bound the equivocation as follows: 11 (65) (66) (67) (68) (69) (70) 11 In (69) and (70), for .
(71)
where (65) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy, (66) follows due to , (67) since is pulled from the key buffer, which contains the key bits generated during superblock , hence
. Equation (68) follows due to the Markov relation in Fig. 7 , along with the Markov chain , and the fact that is independent of . The independence of from follows since is perfectly compressed, i.e., is of size bits with entropy , the one time pad performs as a Vernam cipher. Equation (69) follows due to the chain rule, (70) follows since for any random variables , , and (71) follows since forms a Markov chain for any and , which can be observed from Fig. 7 . Equation (72) follows since for any , is independent of due to the one time pad. Similarly, (73) follows since for any such that , and the fact that and is independent due to one time pad. Finally, (74) follows due to the privacy amplification result in Lemma 9. Then, (75) due to (64) and (74). Now, we bound the second term. By the union bound, (76) where (76) follows due to (51). For ,
Note that, the terms and in (77) are i.i.d. with respect to and , and are independent of each other. Therefore, the expression in (77) represents a random walk with expected drift due to the definition of artificial outage in (51). For 12 , , hence by the law of large numbers, such that , , . Therefore, for the choice , , due to (76), (63), and (75). Hence, the secrecy outage constraint in (7) is satisfied. This concludes the achievability. Now, we prove the converse. Consider a power allocation policy , which satisfies the average power constraint in (1). Let be an -achievable secrecy rate. We will show that . Let . Then such that
where (78) follows directly from the definition of the event , and (79) follows from applying the secrecy outage constraint (7), and the law of large numbers.
It follows from the converse proof of ergodic secrecy capacity [3] , and law of large numbers that such that for every , , and , the time-average equivocation rate 13 is bounded as (80) (81) 12 The reason for introducing artificial outages is to make sure that the expected drift is positive. 13 For any reliable code that yields vanishing probability of error as .
Also note that,
where (82) follows from the fact that forms a Markov chain. From the converse of the coding theorem [13] ; the mutual information expression in (82) is maximized when becomes a Gaussian random vector, and the supremum is the expression in (83).
From (78), (81), and (83), it follows that any -achievable rate is bounded above as
Since and are both deterministic functions of the power and instantaneous channel gains , it follows that the power allocation function that maximizes the right-hand side of (84)-(86) is a stationary function of instantaneous channel gains . Interchanging the notations , and , we can see that the right-hand side of (84) Without loss of generality, we drop the block index and , and focus on the first block , and assume the event does not occur. Let , with sample realization sequences denoted by . Let , where denotes a random universal hash function that maps to an r-bit binary message . Then, it is clear that if error event does not occur, since , for any choice of . To show that the security constraints (53)-(54) are satisfied, we cite the privacy amplification theorem, which is originally defined for discrete channels. For this purpose, we define a quantization function , with sensitivity parameter . Let denote the quantized version of . where denotes realization sequences. Then, by Theorem 3 of [11] there exists a universal function such that 14 Now, we relate this expression to the Shannon entropy of the message, conditioned on eavesdropper's actual received signal. Using the facts and , it is easy to show that Then, due to the asymptotic relationship between continuous random variables and their quantized versions [13] , there exists a quantization function such that is small enough, and (87) are satisfied. To relate min-entropy to Shannon entropy, we use the result of Theorem 1 of [12] ;
, a block length such that ,
Now, we proceed as follows:
where (89) follows from (88), and the appropriate choice of . Equation (90) follows from the fact that forms a Markov chain. Equation (91) follows from the fact that , and similarly , which is the eavesdropper's maximum achievable rate. Let . For the choice of , and
, we obtain
where (92) follows from (87), (91), and the fact that . Equation (93) follows due to the choice of . Hence, for , the constraints (53), (54) are satisfied.
Proof of Lemma 10: The probability of the first term is 0 due to (57). For the second term, note that From Fano's inequality, we obtain (94)
In the error analysis, it is shown that can be made arbitrarily small with increasing block length , which shows that there exists such that for , (94) holds, which proves that the probability of the second term is also 0.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The proof is very similar to the proof for full CSI, hence we only point out the differences. For full CSI, key generation occurs at the end of every block, using privacy amplification. Due to lack of eavesdropper channel state at the legitimate nodes, this is no longer possible. However, as shown in [3] , it is still possible to generate secret key bits over a superblock. The following lemma replaces Lemma 9 in the full CSI case. Note that, we will use the notation for simplicity. Lemma 11: Let be defined as in full CSI case, where There exists such that, , and for any superblock , the transmitter and the receiver generates secret key bits and , respectively, such that if none of the error events occur in superblock , and
The proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 9, and is omitted here. Following the same error and secrecy outage analysis in the full CSI case, we can see that any rate is achievable. The converse proof is also the same as in full CSI case, and is omitted here.
APPENDIX C PROOFS OF RESULTS IN SECTION IV-A
A) Proof of Lemma 1:
The parameter is the maximum value for which the problem (25)-(27) has a solution; hence the average power constraint (26) is active. Moreover, the outage constraint (27) is also active, and due to the fact that is a concave increasing function of , we have , since otherwise one can further increase to find a power allocation function that satisfies the equality. Since for a given , the power allocation function that yields is , we have where the set of channel gains for which the system operates at rate , and . The set contains channel gains for which takes minimum values, so that the average power constraint is satisfied for the maximum possible . Since is a decreasing function of , one can see that the choice of that yields is . Since the probability density function of is well defined, , hence , which, along with , implies that . B) Proof of Lemma 3: Let . Then, any policy that satisfies , would also satisfy . So, the set of power allocation functions that satisfy (27) shrinks as increases, hence is a nonincreasing function of . Now, we prove that is continuous. From Lemma 2, we know that where and are constants that satisfy (23) and (24) with equality with respect to parameters and , respectively. Due to the fact that the functions is continuous and monotone increasing with respect to , is continuous and monotone increasing with respect to , and the fact that integration preserves continuity, for any such that , we can find such that 1 We use Lagrangian optimization approach to find . We can express given in (25)- (27) as (97) where the Lagrangian is given by the equation 15 (98)
Here, is a set which consists of for which must be satisfied. We will show in this proof that it is of the form (20). This problem is identical to (25), since their constraint sets are identical. Hence, solution of this problem would also yield . In the following two-step approach, we proceed to find . Let us fix . 1) For any , we find , which is defined as (99) 2) Using the result of part 1, we find , by finding the set that maximizes , subject to a constraint . We start with step 1. Since both and are fixed, therefore we drop them from and , in the following parts to simplify the notation.
Lemma 12: If the problem (99) has a feasible solution, then it could be expressed as (100) where and are given in (19) and (18), respectively.
Proof: We will interchangeably use Due to (99), , . Hence, there is a minimum power constraint for set , as (101) Define as the set in which the minimum power constraint (101) is not active, i.e., 15 Note that we leave the constraint (27) as is, and not include it in .
where is complement of . First, we focus on the solution in the nonboundary set. Since the optimal solution must satisfy the Euler-Lagrange equations, For , we obtain the following condition:
whose solution yields
If for some , the value is negative, then due to the concavity of with respect to , the optimal value of is zero [3] . Therefore, the solution yields (102) Combining the result with the minimum power constraint inside set , the solution of (99) yields (100), which concludes the proof. Now, we find . We proceed by further simplifying the Lagrangian in (98), for the case where , for a given as follows: (103) After this simplification, the first term in (103) does not depend on . We conclude the proof by showing that where the set is defined as follows:
where the parameter is a constant that satisfies . We prove this by contradiction. First define . Then, it follows from (103) that is the set that maximize (103), so Assume that some other is optimal, where . However, we have (105) since and by definition. This contradicts our assumption that is optimal. Note that, is identical to (21). This concludes the proof.
APPENDIX E PROOF OF LEMMA 5
The proof goes along similar lines as in Appendix D, so we skip the details here. We solve the problem for a fixed . First, for any given , we define the following problem, the solution of which yields :
(107) If the power allocation function that solves the equation is negative, then by the convexity of the objective function [3] , the optimal value of is 0. Hence, we obtain as the resulting power allocation function. Whenever the minimum rate constraint (37) is active, we get the channel inversion power allocation function, . Now, using Lemma 13, we solve the following problem:
the solution of which yields . Lemma 13 proves that the solution is a time-sharing between policies and . Now, we find the optimal .
Lemma 14: The solution of (109) 
Since the key queue has a negative drift, i.e., , it is clear that . Now, we show that . Following the approach of Lemma 15, find such that 16 Since considering otherwise would lead to the uninteresting scenario where there are no buffer overflows (since the key queue cannot grow), hence any buffer size is sufficient to achieve secrecy outage probability.
. Let . Then, , and
The first inequality follows from the fact that with probability , hits at th block and with probability , key queue goes back to state 0 at th block (on average). The last inequality follows from , and ratio test. This result, along with (111) and Lemma 16 concludes that is a positive recurrent regenerative process, which concludes the proof.
B) Proof of Lemma 7:
We follow an indirect approach to prove the lemma. Let denote the key queue dynamics of the same system for the infinite buffer case (
). First, we use the heavy traffic results in [17] to calculate the overflow probability of the infinite buffer queue. Then, we relate the overflow probability of infinite buffer system to the loss ratio of the finite buffer queue. The dynamics of the infinite buffer queue is characterized by (112) where . The heavy traffic results we will use are for queues that have a stationary distribution. Since it is not clear whether is stationary or not, we will upper bound by another stationary process , and the buffer overflow probability result we will get for will serve as an upper bound for . Let be the process that satisfies the following recursion: (113) with . First, we relate to .
Lemma 17: (114)
Proof: Assuming , we need to show by induction that . There are two different scenarios.
1) If , then, using the facts and , we obtain which, using the described key queue recursions in (112), implies
Observe that, by (113), which, in conjunction with (115) and , yields . (119) which is based on the heavy traffic limit for queues developed in [17] , see also Theorem 7.1 in [15] . In order to prove (119), we only need to verify the following three conditions: 1)
; 2) ; and 3) the set of random variables indexed by is uniformly integrable. 
Combining Lemma 20 with (120), the proof is complete.
